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Abstract
The purpose of this study is to introduce the Strategic Assessment Model
(STRATAM), a model designed to assist in the prevention of strategic failure.
STRATAM aids firstly in the assessment of a strategy, as well as its crafting and
evolution; secondly, it aims to enable and possibly streamline civil-military
strategic debates on military operations. It is argued that strategic blunders in
many cases result from latent organizational failures on one’s own side.
Therefore, STRATAM combines Clausewitz’ theory of war and strategy with
organizational failure theory. To demonstrate the use of this model, this paper
uses Operation Cast Lead (or the Gaza War) of 2008-2009 as a case study. The
paper’s findings include that the ultimate reasons for strategic failure were on
one hand Clausewitzian; on the other hand, the Israeli Defense Force’s failure
in organizational learning from a previous war two years earlier. The timely,
strategic assessment and an effective civil-military debate about the effects of
ongoing military operations might have prevented this failure. STRATAM would
have provided the necessary language, structure, and relevance to identify
actual and potential strategic failures with the goal to evolve the strategy.
Introduction
In recent decades, the West – including Israel – has not been particularly
successful in winning wars. Small wars such as the 2008-2009 Israeli Operation
Cast Lead have proven to be an extremely tough strategic challenge. Often,
strategic failure has been attributed to the actions of an asymmetrically fighting
enemy or more recently, to “reasons of complexity”. Yet in contrast to this view,
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strategic failure may in fact be caused by one’s own flawed organizational
processes and human factors. Clausewitz’ notion that “everything in strategy is
very simple, but that does not mean that everything is very easy,” (Clausewitz,
1976: 178) may already be read in this way: while a strategy should not be
overcomplicated, human error prone and thus a set up for failure, strategic
success, in turn, depends on an effective organization including leaders, who are
cognizant of human factors and are able to timely assess and adapt a strategy if
necessary.
So far, the impact of human and organizational factors has been thoroughly
investigated and widely understood in other complex socio-technical endeavors
such as aviation, but its impact on strategy has been overlooked. In military
history, there are multiple and very diverse examples of organizational and
human factors caused failures that have originated at the level of strategic
leadership. Roughly seventy years ago, Winston Churchill observed that
commanders-in-chief are surrounded by “smiling and respectful faces” (Cohen,
2003: 111) that much more prefer to communicate success stories than potential
failures – even occasionally (and in most cases unintentionally) bending the truth
in their interactions with strategic decision makers. Consequently, in spite of
Churchill having been an avid military expert, his “errors of strategic judgment”
were “all too often” induced by his “professional advisors.” (Ibid.: 112)
As another example, commanders-in-chief may also discover the complete
incoherence of strategy during a war. President Barack Obama discovered
shortly after his election, and more than eight years into a war, that “there was no
coherent strategy” (Woodward, 2010: 80) for Afghanistan, let alone “strategic
goals”. (Ibid.) Besides organizational inabilities to come up with a strategy and
failures in communication about strategy within organizations, (Clausewitz,
1976: 149) Douglas Porch points out yet another strategic failure: offering
tactical solutions to strategic problems, such as Counterinsurgency (COIN).
(Few, 2010: 7)
Apart from flawed interaction and the confusion about what the more tactical
and more strategic levels in warfare are, even high-level decision makers
themselves contribute to strategic failure, either out of unfamiliarity with
strategic thought or out of an unwillingness to think strategically. While many

3
political decision makers did not attend any type of strategic leadership school,
even for some well educated defense intellectuals strategy is “intellectual
terrorism” and in these modern times, only “amateurs, to be sure, talk about
strategy.” (Corn, 2008) It seems that not only key strategic decision makers, but
also entire defense organizations, including some contemporary defense
intellectuals may have lost their grounding in the fundamentals of strategic
thought for various reasons, effectively setting up military organizations for
strategic failure.
Hence, the purpose of this paper is to present an original method to assess, adapt,
and evolve a strategy based on human factors and organizational failure theories.
In the view of the author, this model contributes to military and strategic studies
by introducing human factors science to the realm of strategy for the first time.
The model was designed in the year 2012 by the author based on analyses of
recent wars within the scholarly framework of the US Air War College.
Specifically, this model is intended to firstly, enable a quick and focused study of
strategic failures; secondly, it is hoped that the use of this model enables
meaningful debates between strategic experts and non-experts, thus contributing
to the prevention of strategic failure in ongoing campaigns. Besides the critical
claim that strategic failure is more often than not caused by human factors and
organizational failure, this paper argues that STRATAM is an effective means to
assist in the prevention of strategic blunders.
To make this case, the theoretical framework of this study will be based on Carl
von Clausewitz' theory of strategy and war, human factors concepts, and
organizational theory. For this reason, the concept of strategy is viewed as a
complex relationship of the war’s political purpose with the ways, means, and
available resources employed to achieve specific military ends. (Clausewitz,
1976: 89) Apart from this, and following Beyerchen’s (1992) interpretation of
Clausewitz’ concept of strategy, strategic success depends at the same time on
the balance of rational political decision-making with public opinion and the
complexities associated with warfare – under the constraint of limited time,
information, and resources.
The Lebanon War of 2006 and Operation Cast Lead of 2008/2009 will serve as a
case study to demonstrate the application of STRATAM in this study.
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Strategic Failure
Besides strategy, Clausewitz' writings offer a set of various definitions for war.
For one, war is “nothing but a duel on a larger scale”, (Clausewitz, 1976: 75) and
an “act of force to compel our enemy to do our will”. (Ibid.) In another
definition, he argues that war challenges strategy with a “paradoxical trinity”
(ibid.: 89) consisting of emotion, reason, and chance – in modern terms more
closely related to public opinion, political decision-making, and the dynamic
complexity of warfare. Not to forget a fourth and probably his most famous and
most misunderstood definition that “war is merely the continuation of policy by
other means”. (Ibid.: 87) In short, war is a “chameleon”, which continuously
changes its form of appearance and self-adapts to a multitude of contexts. (Ibid.:
89) It is this fickleness and unpredictability of war, which results from a violent
interaction with an enemy who is not “a lifeless mass”; instead, war is a
“collision of two living forces”, with both sides applying strategy against each
other to achieve their own goals. (Ibid.: 77)
A cursory reading of Clausewitz' theory of war may regard his views as too
vague and not precise enough to aid in the crafting or assessment of a strategy. In
fact, there has been recent and substantial criticism, maintaining that On War
does not apply anymore for the “new wars” after the end of the Cold War. Critics
include i.e. distinguished Israeli strategy scholar Martin van Creveld (1991),
claiming that Clausewitz’ theory of war is “intellectual baggage” that needs to be
“thrown overboard” (van Creveld, 1991: 58), since the trinitarian view on war
(which he describes as people, government, and military) has been outdated with
the rise of non-state war. In his British colleague John Keegan’s view, every new
war stands outside of Clausewitz’ framework (Keegan, 1993: 17-18) because, as
Mary Kaldor explains, civilians have now become the main targets and defeating
states with militaries has become history (Kaldor, 2005: 221). Very specifically,
Phillip Meilinger holds Clausewitz responsible for over 3000 US casualties in
Iraq (Meilinger, 2007: 139), and Tony Corn argues that believing in Clausewitz
can lead to “hair rising absurdities about the Global War on Terror” (Corn,
2008).
Yet these arguments may indicate that Clausewitz’ conceptual framework of war
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and strategy and in particular his close relationship to complexity theory and
even postmodern thought is not be well enough understood and does in fact have
considerable explanatory power for the so called “new wars”. In pragmatic
terms, Christopher Bassford (2011) argues that neither van Creveld nor Keegan
fully comprehended On War. Bart Schuurmann makes the point that no matter
who wages war, “whether state, warlord, Communist revolutionary or
international terrorist organization, all entities are subject to the interplay of the
forces of violence, chance, and rational purpose” (Schuurmann, 2010: 95). In
short, especially the complexity of war that results from the interplay of the
different actors and the non-linearity of events (Beyerchen, 1992), is one of the
central points in Clausewitzian thought.
It may even be argued that contemporary complexity theory is in far reaching
agreement with Clausewitz: the greater the number of interplaying actors, ideas,
rules, and technologies are, the greater will be the resulting non-linear
relationship between causes and effects. In this respect, both complexity theory
and Clausewitz' theory of war can be understood as antipodes to modern
thinking. The rational modernity claims that that for one, cause and effect relate
to each other in a determinate manner; second, effects are predictable from
certain events (causes); third, abstraction and simplification – and therefore the
description and understanding of complex situations – is possible; hence fourth,
there are predictable reactions to planned actions; finally, rationally designable
solutions to wicked problems exist.
While On War may be difficult to comprehend indeed, Clausewitz’ theory
centers on the idea that war and strategy are highly complex phenomena caused
by social interaction. Once more, Clausewitz and post-modern complexity theory
agree: due to these social interactions, cause and effect do not relate computably.
Instead, effects emerge from various, seemingly negligible, often unintended
causes. But understanding and coping with interaction problems in sociotechnical environments is less a strategic problem than it is a human factors and
organizational question.
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Human factors and organizational theory apply in the operational realm
The study of human factors and use of organizational models emerged in the
1930s with Heinrich’s (1931) domino theory, followed by Charles Perrow’s
(1984) Normal Accident Theory (NAT) many decades later and recently the
High Reliability Organization theory (HRO, Senge, 1995). These theories and
models are based on the idea that blunders occur as a result from a series of
preceding factors, which are set up and shaped by the leadership of an
organization and the organization itself in terms of its structures and processes.
The most important insight of these models for strategic problems is that these
preconditions, which increase the probability of unsafe behaviors, such as
inappropriate decision-making, may be preventable on the organizational level.
On the human factors side, the SHELL model provided a new look at the role of
humans in a complex system since the 1970s. The name is an acronym formed
by initial letters of its components Software, Hardware, Environment, and
Liveware, (Skybrary, 2011) where “Software” stands for rules, policies, doctrine
and “Hardware” for technology. According to this model, failure results from
interaction problems between the human element (“Liveware”) and the other
components of the model in a VUCAD environment. The take-away from this
model for the realm of war and strategy is the idea that an analysis of individual
operational parts such as doctrine (“Software”), technology (“Hardware”),
human resources (“Liveware”), and the operational VUCAD environment by
itself will not deliver useful answers when assessing a strategy or strategic
failure. Instead, the interplay between and mutual influences of these
components must be evaluated.
Since the 1990s, James Reason’s Swiss Cheese model (1990) successfully
combined organizational models based on Heinrich's Domino Theory with
human factors. In his model, the higher levels of an organization directly
influence the next lower level until ultimately the act of failure occurs. Thus,
failures on the strategic level will eventually manifest themselves in operational
and tactical errors – either as a failed attempt to implement the strategy, or as a
deviation from it. In other words, strategic failure is a latent failure, which may
be dormant for a long time until one day it will directly affect the military
operations on the battlefield, and thus become an active failure. Reason's model
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has since been updated by other non-linear accident models such as FRAM
(Hollnagel, 2004) and STAMP (Leveson, 2004).
Until roughly 10 years ago, these models were used almost exclusively in
aviation contexts. (Porter, 1964) Later, their use expanded into other areas,
including the medical field, (Emslie et al. 2002) emergency response, (MacLeod,
2011) and crime prevention. (Holderstein-Holtermann, 2009) Yet since the
1990s, the notions of “accident” and “safety” have been broadened to “failure”
and “absence of failure” respectively, which enabled the use of these models in
the realms of business and management. (Reason, 2000) In military applications
other than aviation, the question of human factors has mainly reappeared in the
context of Network Centric Warfare. (NCW, NAGO, 2010, US Air Force 2006,
and Australian Department of Defence, 2004).
However, the widely used organizational and human factors models of the late
1990s, such as Reason’s Swiss Cheese model and others do not explain what
these latent failures exactly are. (Shappell and Wiegmann, 2000) Thus, a
comprehensive conceptual framework for organizational failure was still
missing, which was subsequently corrected by Shappell and Wiegmann with the
introduction of their Human Factors Analysis and Classification System
(HFACS) in the year 2000. Today, HFACS is the most widely used model to
analyze the roles that humans and organizations play in cases of organizational
failure. (Stringfellow, 2010)
HFACS is in essence based on Reason’s failure causation model and on the idea
of linear cause-and-effect relationships in an organization. According to
Margaret Stringfellow (2010: 39), “linear accident models view the occurrence
of accidents as the result of a chain of events or linear sequences of failures. If
one event in the proximate causal chain is prevented from occurring, the accident
will not occur. Thus, hazard analyses based on linear accident models are geared
towards finding sequences of failures that can lead to accidents.” It is important
to point out that sequences of failures may result from active or, more
importantly, latent systemic failures. Active failures are noticeable events or
specific human actions that directly result in an accident or a failure. Yet latent
failures are dormant, but no less problematic properties of an organization setting
it up for failure – if only given the right circumstances. In most cases, these
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latent failures become clearly noticeable only after an accident or failure has
occurred and the subsequent investigation reveals the cause-and-effect
relationships as well as the “chain of events”, which led up to the failure. In
short, Reason-based failure causation models seek to detect and describe the
latent or dormant failures on higher, strategic levels of an organization, which
may precede the actual failure on the “sharp end” of an organization, and which
become only then visible in retrospect when an operational fiasco has already
occurred.

Figure 1. Human Factors Analysis and Classification System
Similar to most human factors and organizational failure and accident causation
models, HFACS itself was originally intended for aviation, listing and
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structuring errors, faults, problems, and bad decisions in organizations consisting
of human actors. The four levels of this model include the lowest, tactical level
of “Unsafe Acts”, made up of “Violations” and “Errors”. According to this
model, errors occur due to the influence of particular conditions, which are
relevant for each different, actual situation. These influences constitute the
second level in HFACS; Shappell and Wiegmann label it “Preconditions”. The
third level relates to operational leadership and is called “Unsafe Supervision”. It
consists of leadership failures such as bad planning, not correcting problems, or
inadequate leadership involvement. The highest, strategic level is labeled
“Organizational Influences”, and includes problems of resourcing, organizational
climate, and processes. The original HFACS model looks like this (retrieved
from: http://www.hfacs.com/sites/default/files/HFACS-Tree_0.png).
While in a recent critique of this model, Margret Stringfellow criticizes its “too
vague” and “not disjoint enough” differentiations of detailed human and
organizational classifications, her criticism does not quite apply to the realm of
strategy. The model’s inherent vagueness and ambiguity correlates satisfactorily
to, what Clausewitz describes by the term “art” (Clausewitz, 1976: 170) of war
and war’s “realm of uncertainty” – in other words, Stringfellow’s criticism seem
to make this model even more suitable for the assessment of strategy. (Ibid.: 101)
STRATAM as a Synthesis of Strategic and Organizational Theory
The Strategic Assessment Model (STRATAM) is a relatively simple model for
strategic assessment, based on human factors and organizational failure theories
and Clausewitz' theory of war. It is not only intended to support the processes of
crafting, assessing, and evolving a strategy, but also to enable and ease civilmilitary strategic debates. Since Clausewitz’ theory provides a valid framework
for the assessment of strategy, an adaptation of the HFACS model for the
framework of warfare becomes possible. The highest organizational level of this
model corresponds to the political level, whereas the model’s lowest level
corresponds to the operational level – being the sharp end of a strategic
organization in war. Moreover, it is the operational level where latent, strategic
organizational failures translate into active and actual operational fiascos.
Therefore, drawing upon Clausewitz’ theory of strategy and the structural
framework of HFACS, the four levels of strategic failure in STRATAM are: 1)
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Political Influences, 2) Military-Strategic Influences, 3) Preconditions for
Operational Failure, and 4) Operational Failures.

Figure 2: Strategic Analysis and Classification System (STRATAM)
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On the lowest, operational level, actions may result in kinetic or non-kinetic acts
of failure and can be categorized in two alternatives: either an operational
commander took action in an attempt to follow his or her commander’s intent
and thus the overall strategy, or conversely, the local commander chose not to
follow the overall intent or strategy. More specifically, failures that have
resulted after an operational commander was indeed following the strategic
intent means that these type of failures fall under the “error” classification in the
sense of the original HFACS model. If a failure has occurred after a commander
did not follow the strategic intent, this type of failure could in theory be filed
under the “violations” category in the sense of the original HFACS model. Yet in
some cases, a commander may have different and valid reasons for not following
the strategic intent because the situation dictates a different course of action.
Thus, classifying the immediate causes for operational failure as either errors or
violation would fall short because it would fail to consider the dynamic
complexity of warfare.
On the next level, STRATAM takes a look at the preconditions, which may have
existed and led to the local commander’s irksome decisions and actions. Here,
STRATAM suggests three categories, centering on Clausewitzian concepts of
friction, (Clausewitz, 1976: 119) the fog of war, (ibid.: 101 and 140) and
inadequate modes of reasoning. (Ibid.: 100) For Clausewitz, the modes of
military reasoning in war should integrate scientific thought (what he calls
mathematical or geometrical thinking as well as probability calculation) with
what he calls the “art of war” and the “genius” of a commander, which relate to
creativity, critical thinking and intuition. While every mode of reasoning should
be applied at the right time and for the right set of circumstances to succeed, the
common error, according to Clausewitz, is an over-reliance on logical-analytical
reasoning.
Frictional preconditions include operational leaders’ interaction problems (ibid.:
149) with doctrine, with their peers or subordinate commanders (in other words
communication failures), and failing to adequately employ available technology.
Preconditions summarized as the “fog of war” include informational problems
(ibid.: 140) such as the lack of information, or data overload (ibid.: 178) as well
as an unclear commander’s intent. (Ibid.: 87-88 and 90-99) Inadequate modes of
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reasoning are unique to each situation (ibid.: 119) and include misapplied
operational art (ibid.: 100-103, 111, and 112) or science, (ibid.: 85-86) as well as
adverse emotional states. (Ibid.: 104-116) Besides Clausewitz’ theory of
warfare, this section of preconditions relates most closely to the operational
challenge of situational awareness; a concept, which according to Mica Endsley
(1995) consists of three levels: level 1, perception, regards the ability to perceive
the relevant factors of a situation, level 2, comprehension, regards to an
understanding of what these factors mean in terms of their impact on the
possibility to achieve one’s own goals. Level 3, projection, regards to the ability
to project the unfolding of events and the ability to predict what will happen
next.
All preconditions for operational failure are themselves influenced by the
military-strategic level. This level includes possible dormant failures such as the
Clausewitzian concepts of unachievable military objectives, (Clausewitz, 1976:
80-81) inadequate means and methods, (ibid.: 143-144) failures to critically and
creatively think through and wargame the adversary’s behavior, (ibid.: 579-580)
and the failure to query the political strategy: in the view of Eliot Cohen (2003),
if the course of a war does not unfold according to plan, the interaction of the
overall military commander with his or her political leaders becomes even more
critical. Thus, argues Cohen, it is the duty of senior military leadership to query
the strategy and, if necessary, convince political leaders to review and adapt the
overall war aim and its purpose. (Clausewitz, 1976: 608-609)
The remaining military-strategic level influence, labeled ineffective
organizational learning, (ibid.: 88) not only roots in organizational failure theory,
but also in Clausewitz' theory of war. Both organizational theory and Clausewitz
describe organizational learning as the ability to adapt to a (changing)
environment. This relates back to Clausewitz’ (1976: 88) imperative that “the
first, the supreme, the most far-reaching act of judgment that the statesman and
commander have to make is to establish by that test the kind of war on which
they are embarking; neither mistaking it for, nor trying to turn it into, something
that is alien to its nature”.
The top level of politico-strategic influences encompasses an assessment of the
“concerns of the people” as Clausewitz puts it, or public opinion, (ibid.: 89) and
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the assignment to consult the civilian government early enough in case the war
might lose approval on the home front. Liddell Hart supports this view by
claiming that “the people’s willing spirit is often as important as to possess the
more concrete forms of power” in matters of strategy and war. (Liddell Hart,
1967: 322)
The remaining categories on the level of political influences is labeled resources,
in the sense of “all the resources of a nation”, (ibid.) which has been introduced
by Liddell Hart as a more precise definition of the term “means”, which has been
coined by Clausewitz for the realm of strategy, reminding the military leadership
to query its political leadership about the necessary strategic and grand strategic
means to achieve the military objectives, and an assessment on who’s side time
is on. Time, maintains Clausewitz, does not favor the potential victor.
(Clausewitz, 1976: 597-598)
Overall, the synthesis of HFACS and Clausewitz’ theory of strategy form a
relatively simple and easy to use model to study, assess, debate, and evolve a
strategy if necessary, thus ideally preventing strategic failure. Further, the
model’s simple structure and plain text classifications should enable a
meaningful strategic debate between strategic experts and non-experts. Hence,
the following case study will illustrate the use of this model.

A Case Study of Strategic Failure
The subject of this case study is Operation Cast Lead, otherwise known as the
Gaza War, which started on December 27th, 2008 and ended 34 days later. Yet
this war cannot be studied in isolation, and should instead be assessed in terms of
lessons learned by the Israeli Defense Force from the Lebanon War two years
earlier.
The Lebanon War of 2006
On July 12th, 2006, a Hezbollah commando unit kidnapped two Israeli soldiers
and killed three others. Within hours, the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) started a
retaliatory air campaign, intended to achieve a set of predetermined effects,
which were calculated to convince the Hezbollah that their military operations
would be futile and that they better stop fighting. The IDF followed its new
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concept Systemic Operational Design (SOD, Sorrels et al., 2005) a brainchild of
Israeli Defense Forces brigadier general Shimon Naveh, who claims that this
operational concept is entirely different to every other western approach to
military operations becauseevery conventaional approach will include one or
more clearly defined, ultimate goals as the outcome of a war. In contrast to this,
SOD does not worry about clearly defined end states. Instead, SOD constantly
tries to move toward a more favorable state. The guiding principle of SOD is the
dynamic adaptation of military forces to a VUCA(D) enviornment. What the
more favorable state is and what the subsequent operational actions must entail
to reach it, is a leadership problem (for more information, see Sorrells at al,
2005). Critics of SOD claim that this concept is above all confusing and
incomprehensible to the average officer (Kober, 2006). For Vego (2009), SOD is
heavily influenced by French post-modern thinkers such as Lyotard (2006),
Baudrillard (2002), and Virilio (2002), who are not only leftist, anti-capitalist,
and incomprehensible, but more importantly “full of nonsense”. In essence,
argues Vego (2009), one cannot win a war with the views of these philosophers.
In any case, a large-scale ground invasion, including a potentially high number
of friendly casualties, was regarded as unnecessary by IDF strategic command.
(Sorrells et al., 2005) According to Israeli defense intellectual Amir Kulick, the
general secretary of Hezbollah implied a quite different reason for the preference
of air war, viewing the Israeli society as fragile and post-heroic and thus unable
to bear the casualties of war. (Hezbollah vs. the IDF, 2006) Consistent with
SOD, the IDF air strikes targeted command and control facilities, logistics
centers, as well as transport and communication nodes – but not Hezbollah units
directly. As a result, dispersed Hezbollah units were able to launch over 100
rockets per day on Israeli soil from positions that were hidden and equipped
prewar. (Crooke, Alastair, and Perry, 2006) Even more critical, after a few days
of heavy air strikes it became clear that both IDF operational objectives could
not be achieved. Hezbollah neither released the Israeli soldiers, nor could the air
strikes prevent the rocket attacks. Consequently, and in clear opposition to SOD
and strategic planning, the IDF started a ground offensive – with mixed success
at best. The IDF at this time specialized in counterinsurgency operations showed
a considerable lack of performance when confronted with conventional
operations such as armored combat and urban warfare. But the IDF’s strategic
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failure occurred in a different domain of warfare.
Israeli forces were unable to shut down the al-Manar TV station, which
continued to report about the heroic and successful defense of the Hezbollah
fighters. At the same time, Israeli state-owned TV sharply criticized the IDF and
its “idiotic military operations”, while the print press in Israel criticized the
military leadership, claiming that the IDF was unable to reach any of its
operational goals. Moreover, after the IDF attacked Hezbollah infrastructure in
one instance, causing a number of civilian casualties, the international press
largely switched from supporting the IDF towards a support of the Hezbollah. As
a consequence, the IDF as well as the Israeli public started to feel that the war
would be lost. Finally, the war ended 34 days after it began, with a cease-fire that
took effect on 14 August 2006. The two kidnapped IDF soldiers were returned
dead to Israel, over 1000 Lebanese were killed, Lebanese infrastructure was
severely damaged and hundreds of thousands of people on both sides were
displaced. More importantly for the IDF, its result was a strategic failure for
Israel.
Operation Cast Lead, 2008/2009
After thousands of rocket and mortar attacks from the Gaza-strip and hundreds
of civilian casualties in Israel, the IDF attacked Hamas and other organizations
within Gaza two years after the war in South Lebanon. The attacks began on
December 27th, 2008 with probably the heaviest air strikes since the Six Day
War in 1967. (Mittelstaedt, 2009) This time, the air campaign applied lessons
learned from the Lebanon war two years earlier. Its first phase now included
targeting Hamas directly, so that in next phase, IDF armored units would be able
to divide the Gaza strip into two parts. In phase three, infantry units were
supposed to occupy both areas. Overall, this operational sequence was planned in
an effort to minimize the number of friendly casualties. (Beste et al., 2009)Three
weeks later, Israeli Prime Minister Olmert announced that the objectives of the
war had been achieved; yet the Gaza Strip was by this time far from fully
occupied by the IDF. Three days after Prime Minister Olmert’s announcement,
Hamas announced a cease-fire and on the same day the IDF withdrew their
forces from Gaza. Overall, Operation Cast Lead was widely regarded as the
second Israeli defeat within two years.
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Another Strategic Defeat with Media Weapons
What were the strategic lessons learned from the Lebanon war two years earlier?
First, the IDF would not allow the press inside the operations area; second, a
Media Operations Center, similar to one operated by NATO during the Kosovo
war and a similar one operated by US and coalition forces during the Iraq war in
2003 was tasked to provide the press with information regarding the war from a
single point. (Bockstette et al. [ed.], 2006) By doing this, the IDF attempted to
avoid another round of negative interviews with critical Israeli military personnel
as had happened two years earlier. Third, the IDF hired a British company to
monitor and improve the IDF’s media image in preparation for and during the
operation to have a better position in the battle for public opinion, both at home
and abroad. (Witcher, 2009) The IDF even planned to use “the new media” to
present information on all existing platforms. (Ehrenberg and Sagatz, 2009)
Based on that concept, the IDF set up a YouTube channel, on which videos shot
from the cockpit of fighter-bombers showed the precise destruction of
Palestinian Kassam missiles that were fired from schoolyards or other public
places. (Philipp, 2009) The idea was to present the images of a humane war, and
an IDF that tried everything possible to avoid the unnecessary suffering of
innocent people. But already on January 9, 2009, a Swiss newspaper started to
realize that the IDF was not interested in what was actually and objectively
happening in Gaza, but instead that the IDF’s strategic priority was to
subjectively influence worldwide public opinion in favor of Israel’s cause.
(Stadler, 2009: 16) In Germany, the Deutsche Welle cited the IDF spokesman
Rutland explaining on 9 January 2009 that “media are an additional front where
a war may be won or lost in many ways”. (Informationskrieg um Gaza, 2009)
Overall, members of the international press quickly and widely resented what
they considered undue influence and propaganda. Consequently, international
media companies hired Palestinian amateur journalists to report from inside the
Gaza Strip. The German newspaper die tageszeitung commented that reports
from inside Gaza depended on a “handful of courageous local camera men, and a
new generation of professional English-speaking Palestinian journalists”. (ElGawhary, 2008: 2) These ad-hoc cameramen promptly delivered gruesome
footage to an international audience as they covered an IDF mortar attack on
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January 7, which resulted in the death of 39 Palestinians, including women and
children. On the following day of the international press coverage, the IDF
media operations center reacted with unusual emotion, noticeably in attempt to
reduce the strategic damage: IDF media officers contacted journalists and
explained that it would be very important to understand that Hamas was
responsible for this “heart-breaking tragedy” because its fighters fired first upon
Israeli forces from a school yard. (Schmitz, 2009: 5) But the graphic images shot
by the Palestinian amateur cameramen were by far more influential than Israeli
press statements. Already another day later, the IDF’s carefully thought out
media strategy and its live video of precision air strikes had no chance anymore
against “shock-images of dead bodies ripped in pieces” and “against the images
of desperate parents carrying lifeless children into overcrowded hospitals in
Gaza”. (Brüning, 2009: 5)
While the international press (Mertins, 2008: 14) quickly realized that also their
impromptu-journalists were delivering strategic propaganda rather than objective
footage, the Palestinian reporters were nevertheless able to continue airing their
highly influential view of the war. (St. Galler Tageblatt, 2008: 15) Moreover,
Hamas began to both direct and edit footage. By January 10, 2009, Palestinian
fighters started to bluntly force local cameramen to film only that what was
deemed fit for Hama’s own cause, such as “bleeding children” and “screaming
women” (Krieg ohne Chronisten, 2008: 15) – in any case portraying Hamas as
the “victim” of the IDF. In addition, merely hinting at any censorship by Hamas
would have been a death sentence for the local reporter, as the group had already
executed some of these amateur journalists as collaborators. In a further
evolution of their media strategy to win the hearts of the international public,
Hamas began to stage some of the footage. As Spiegel Online put it: “when three
dead children sit next to each other on a couch, then this image is not credible.”
(Putz, 2009) Yet the IDF’s inability to assess and change its media strategy in
time had dire consequences. On January 09th, the Swiss NZZ speculates, “on the
level of strategic communications, Israel will not be able to win this war”.
(Kommunikationskrieg bereits verloren, 2009) The Austrian journal Die Presse
summed it up, one day prior to Israel’s cease fire announcement: “it is war, thus
emotion wins, not information”. (Grimm, 2009)
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Discussion
While the guiding idea of this paper is to introduce a model as a simple
assessment tool for strategy, STRATAM is not intended as an all-encompassing
investigation tool for military operations. Different individuals and organizations
will always evaluate wars based on their own individual access to a diverse range
of information sources. In other words, both strategy and the evaluation of it is a
complex and creative process. Thus, the following discussion sets out to
illustrate how this model may be applied based on the available information –
even in a so-called “new war”, which proves to be not as anti-Clausewitzian as
some defense intellectuals seem to think. Ideally, STRATAM will be used to
assess ongoing military operations on a strategic level, in order to evolve the
strategy in order to ultimately prevent strategic failure.
The STRATAM assessment process may start at any time after or during an
operation. To start the process, an event should be identified, which has had
unintended or negative consequences. In Operation Cast Lead, for example,
multiple events would fall under this category and could have probably delivered
promising results in terms of a strategic assessment. For the purpose of this
paper, only the information provided earlier will be used. Thus, the AFP press
release from January 07th of 2009, a report from inside Gaza, serves as the initial
event for analysis, which stated that the IDF strategic communication plan had
failed because of the published images of dead children. As a reminder, the AFP
was among the news agencies that were locked out of the Gaza Strip by decision
of the IDF. Therefore, the IDF commander who was responsible for enforcing
the media lockout followed the overall commander’s intent and strategic
communications plan.
The next question is, why this overall commander’s intent was in place – in other
words, what preconditions existed that have caused the uncommented airing of
this extremely biased and highly influential footage. According to STRATAM,
this would be a frictional event. While the unfortunate collateral damage has had
its own set of preconditions, the event of strategic importance was its media
exploitation – which in turn was caused by doctrine.
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More precisely, the strategic precondition for this operational fiasco was the
IDF’s strategic communications doctrine. Although only little information is
accessible through unclassified sources, the follow-on question would be
whether the IDF had critically and creatively thought through and properly
wargamed the operation (including its strategic communication plan) with
enough degrees of freedom for the red and neutral side to find out how the
adversary and the international press might react to being locked out. This
question is insofar valid, because the lost media war contributed significantly to
the IDF’s failure in the Lebanon War of 2006. Thus, a further critical question
about the IDF’s organizational learning processes and ability (which is another
category on this STRATAM level), presents itself. Moreover, it may be assumed
that the strategic goal of preventing reports of strategic significance was in itself
not only unachievable, but the IDF possessed neither the means, nor the methods
to achieve this goal. In short, a lack of strategic thought becomes evident. The
remaining subcategory on the military-strategic level asks whether the IDF
commanders actually queried the strategy in an attempt to correct it, in case this
strategic guidance came from the political level. As the highest, political level of
STRATAM points out, failing to correct a strategy might result in the loss of a
favorable public opinion, followed by the loss of support from the public for the
war – which will the result in strategic failure overall.
Therefore, the ultimate reason for strategic failure was in fact essentially
Clausewitzian: the loss of Israeli public support, preceded by the loss of
international public support for this war. Consequently, the IDF command
should have demanded a decisive change in media strategy and strategic
communication policy – immediately after the first negative reports with
potential significant impact on public opinion. Without public support, the grand
strategic goal of continuing military operations in order to achieve the
Clausewitzian goal of strategy – a more favorable peace – became unattainable.
Besides the failure to adapt and change its strategic communication doctrine in
time, the IDF failed to learn as a strategic organization from the war two years
earlier. After the devastating strategic effects of negative media coverage in the
Lebanon War of 2006, a realistic wargame could have probably prevented a
similar experience of strategic failure two years later.
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Further, due to the faulty media and communications plan, the strategic objective
to positively shape Israeli and international media became an unachievable goal,
given the available means in particular circumstances. In the Clausewitzian
sense, the IDF did not fully understand the kind of war on which they are
embarking, thus mistaking this war for something that was alien to its nature.
(Clausewitz, 1976: 88) This latent strategic failure became active through IDF
commanders on the operational level, on the “sharp end” of the Israeli strategic
organization, who locked out international media – fully in accordance with their
strategic commanders’ intent and the poorly thought-out and never adapted IDF
strategic communications doctrine. As a result, time worked against the IDF –
within a matter of days.
Conclusion
In current strategic debates, failed strategies often have been explained with an
inability to follow Sun Tsu’s imperative to know the enemy! for various reasons.
As a result, large portions of military investment and effort have been directed
toward intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance superiority. Yet Sun Tsu’s
other half of this imperative to know yourself!, in other words, the human factors
aspect of strategy seems to have been overlooked. More precisely and to the
knowledge of the author, human factors and organizational theory has been
largely neglected in the study of politico-military problem solving in the
complex environment of war. Thus, STRATAM was proposed to aid in the
prevention of strategic blunders as a result of organizational failure. Using this
model to study the case of the Gaza War of 2008/2009, it was found that Israel’s
strategic failure could have probably been prevented through a timely and
comprehensive strategic debate across all operational levels – including the
highest political decision-makers. With the use of a simple model such as
STRATAM, this strategic debate could have potentially recognized and assessed
the disastrous effects of the chosen communications strategy, and prompted a
decisive and timely correction of it on the operational level.
Besides, STRATAM confirms the findings of contemporary organizational
theory research, which argues that operational fiascos in most cases are not
simply caused by external influence, by the environment, or by surprise, but
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instead are the direct result of one's own organizational failure: a functioning
high reliability organization must be expected to cope with complex and
unexpected situations successfully. In more abstract terms, this study illustrated
the importance of organizational theory for strategy and suggested a model to
measure an organization’s actual performance.
Yet the political and military-strategic influences in a complex and dynamic
environment such as warfare will include latent organizational failures a priori,
which may a posteriori create preconditions for operational failure at the sharp
end of a military organization. Hence it is the goal of STRATAM aiding
strategists in the task of identifying and eliminating these latent failures before
they become active and cause a military operation to fail.
In the case of the Gaza War of 2008/2009, an application of STRATAM shows
that Israel’s strategic failure could have probably been prevented through a
timely and comprehensive strategic debate across all operational levels –
including the highest, political decision-makers. With the use of a model such as
the one suggested in this paper, the strategic debate could have potentially led to
the recognition and assessment of the disastrous effects resulting from the chosen
communications strategy, and prompted a decisive and timely correction.
One limitation, however, is worth noting. While STRATAM offered usable
results in the analysis of the 2008/2009 Gaza War, the model should be
reassessed more often for consistency and completeness through the analysis of
other recent wars such as Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya, and Syria. Yet, future work
should not only focus on a reassessment of the model itself, but also on
individual, latent or active failure modes, as described in each individual element
of the model.
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